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Objectives: To assess the effectiveness of the response of NHS hospital trusts to an alert issued by the
National Patient Safety Agency designed to limit the availability of concentrated potassium chloride in
hospitals in England and Wales, and to determine the nature of any unintended consequences.
Design: Multi-method study involving interviews and a physical inspection of clinical areas.
Setting: 207 clinical areas in 20 randomly selected acute NHS trusts in England and Wales between 31
October 2002 and 31 January 2003.
Participants: Senior managers and ward based medical and nursing staff.
Main outcome measures: Degree of staff awareness of and compliance with the requirements of the
national alert, withdrawal of concentrated potassium chloride solutions from non-critical areas, provision
of pre-diluted alternatives, storage and recording in accordance with controlled drug legislation.
Results: All trusts required that potassium chloride concentrate be stored in a separate locked cupboard
from common injectable diluents (100% compliance). Unauthorised stocks of potassium chloride were
found in five clinical areas not authorised by the trust (98% compliance). All trusts required documentation
control of potassium chloride concentrate in clinical areas, but errors were recorded in 20 of the 207
clinical areas visited (90% compliance). Of those interviewed, 78% of nurses and 30% of junior doctors
were aware of the alert.
Conclusions: The NPSA alert was effective and resulted in rapid development and implementation of local
policies to reduce the availability of concentrated potassium chloride solutions. The success is likely to be
partly due to the nature of the proposed changes and it cannot be assumed that future alerts will be equally
effective. Continued vigilance will be necessary to help sustain the changes.
I
t has been estimated that adverse events feature in around
10% of admissions to hospital, affecting 850 000 people a
year,1 costing the NHS in the region of £2 billion,2 and
causing pain and suffering to patients. It was in order to
reduce the incidence of such incidents that the National
Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) was established in 2001 to
monitor adverse incidents and improve patient safety in
England and Wales. This body, like its counterparts in the US
and in Australia, made concentrated potassium products the
subject of its first alert.3–5
The fatal consequences of inappropriate administration of
strong potassium chloride solution have been acknowledged
for many years. The substance has been used inadvertently
instead of sodium chloride to flush IV lines; instead of water
for injection to reconstitute antibiotics; or has been confused
with frusemide, a loop diuretic with which it is frequently
given.6 7 Such confusion is exacerbated by the fact that high
concentration potassium chloride is produced by a variety of
manufacturers in ampoules that commonly resemble those
containing sodium chloride and water for injection (fig 1).
Even when diluted, the substance may give rise to problems
because its hyperbaric properties make adequate mixing
difficult. However, because blood potassium levels below
2.5 mmol are potentially fatal and need urgent and carefully
titrated correction, many clinicians have opposed previous
attempts to remove it from clinical areas. A summary of the
alert is given in box 1 and full details are available from the
NPSA website (http://81.144.177.110/site/media/documents/
486_riskalertpsa01.pdf).
Given that this was the first directive from a new NHS
organisation, it was important to study its effect so, 1 month
after the publication of the alert by the NPSA, we were
commissioned to evaluate its impact. The study aims were to
examine the receipt, dissemination, and management of the
alert and to assess the extent of compliance with its
requirements. Data collection started 1 week after the date
Figure 1 Plastic ampoules of sodium chloride, water for injection, and
strong potassium chloride. Picture courtesy of Hull and East Yorkshire
NHS Trust.
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by which it was supposed to be implemented (31 October
2002) and was completed 3 months later.
METHODS
We planned to carry out this research in a random sample of
20 NHS hospital trusts. Forty NHS trusts were initially
identified by applying computer generated random numbers
to a Department of Health list of acute trusts. After taking
mergers into account, the Chief Executives and Medical
Directors of 37 trusts were invited to take part in two studies,
the second of which (evaluation of the implementation of
NICE guidance) entailed a detailed audit of patient records.8
Twenty trusts finally agreed to take part in both studies, the
remainder citing as a reason the workload implications of the
NICE study. The sample exhibited features of good geogra-
phical spread, size distribution, and performance rating
(see Appendix 4 available online at http://www.qshc.com/
supplemental). The study was exempted from ethics approval
by the South East MREC who classified it as an audit.
Semi-structured interview schedules for senior managers
and structured schedules for ward staff were developed and
administered by experienced nurse teachers from the
University of York (see Appendices 1 and 2 available online
at http://www.qshc.com/supplemental). Documentary evi-
dence of action and consultation was collected to form an
‘‘audit trail’’. The same researchers also undertook an
inspection of 10 clinical areas in each trust selected for the
likelihood of regular potassium use.
Interviews with senior managers
All medical directors, clinical governance leads, chief
pharmacists, chief nurses and clinical risk managers were
approached for interview using a semi-structured format. We
also interviewed others identified as having a key role in the
dissemination and implementation process. Specific data
were recorded on the interview schedules with these 70
senior managers to enable the development of descriptive
statistics, but interviews were also recorded and transcribed.
Data analysis was concurrent and clear thematic categories
and subcategories emerged.9 10 These categories were devel-
oped by two researchers working independently, and
differences compared and reconciled by discussion.
Differences between trusts and groups of respondents were
examined using analytical matrices.11
Ward audits
Although the NPSA alert named some specific clinical areas
that would require continued access to the concentrate, it
also referred to ‘‘other specialist critical care areas’’ and it was
found that most pharmacy departments held their own list of
‘‘authorised areas’’. In each trust at least five authorised and
five unauthorised wards were visited and audited for
availability, storage, and recording of potassium chloride
using an audit checklist (see Appendix 3 available online at
http://www.qshc.com/supplemental). Researchers inspected
all drug cupboards, drug trolleys, other storage facilities, and
preparation surfaces in both patient areas and in clinical
preparation rooms. In addition, they examined opened boxes
and containers holding sterile water and sodium chloride for
injection and examined books used for recording the use of
potassium. In total, 207 areas were inspected.
Ward staff interviews
A convenience sample of eight registered nurse ward
managers and two junior doctors in each trust was
interviewed to ascertain their awareness of the NPSA
requirements and to explore any problems that had arisen
since the implementation of the alert (see box 2 for
definitions of staff types). In total, 166 ward managers (or
their nominees) and 37 junior medical staff were interviewed
in addition to 14 others including night nursing staff. A
structured interview schedule was used for these interviews
and these were coded and analysed using SPSS.
Audit trail
Trusts were asked to provide evidence of action taken in
advance of and immediately following the alert. These data—
consisting of policies, memos and minutes of meetings—
were used to triangulate the information given in the
interviews.
RESULTS
The results reported here represent a distillation of data from
all sources. The themes emerging from the senior manager
interviews and the open questions in the structured inter-
views with ward staff related to previous action, dissemina-
tion, awareness and reaction, implementation of the
guidance (storage, recording and authorisation), actual and
potential unintended consequences and unresolved issues.
Previous action taken
Interviews with senior managers revealed that 19 trusts
(95%) had previously taken some prior action to reduce
dependence on the concentrated solution although only one
was fully compliant with all aspects of the guidance at the
Box 1 Requirements of the NPSA alert on
potassium products
Potassium chloride (KCl) concentrate solutions and other
strong potassium solutions should be:
N restricted to intensive care environments;
N prepared in pharmacies when no commercial product
of the correct concentration is available;
N subject to the same recording processes as controlled
drugs;
N stored in a locked cupboard;
N signed for by a second practitioner;
N not transferred between clinical areas.
Box 2 Definitions of professional roles
N Medical director: trust board member representing
doctors
N Clinical governance lead: executive member of trust
board with responsibility for clinical quality
N Ward manager/ward sister/charge nurse: registered
nurse in charge of ward
N Junior doctor: all non-consultant grades
N Clinical risk manager: person responsible for under-
taking risk assessments and identifying and addressing
potential and actual clinical risk.
N House officer: newly qualified doctor in pre-registra-
tion year
N Senior house officer: registered doctor who has
completed a minimum of 1 year’s practice after
qualifying.
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time the alert was published. All managerial claims were
substantiated by the audit trail.
Dissemination, awareness, and reaction
Interviews with ward based personnel revealed that an
average of 135 nurses (79%) and 11 doctors (30%) were
aware of the alert and could provide information concerning
the provisions. Most nurses welcomed the action taken,
typical comments being:
‘‘It’s not about making our jobs more difficult, it’s about
protecting us. It’s been quite reassuring and improved safety. It
recognises that we are humans and we do make mistakes.’’ (Ward
sister)
‘‘The guidance has resulted in the benefit of having peace of
mind.’’ (Staff nurse)
There was considerable variation in the means by which
nursing and medical staff at ward level had become aware of
the policy or its provisions (table 1). Circulation of the policy,
staff meetings, and oral communication by pharmacists
appeared to be the most effective mechanisms for commu-
nicating with nursing staff, whilst memos, emails, and
overheard conversations were the means by which most
junior doctors had received the information. The ward
interviews revealed that doctors were, almost without
exception, unaware of any procedures relating to storage
and recording of drugs or of obtaining them out of hours,
claiming that these were nursing responsibilities.
Authorisation of areas
Four pharmacists reported having discussions with the NPSA
to determine whether they could authorise theatres or
paediatric units to hold the concentrated solution and had
been told that this was possible, subject to a full risk
assessment. The range in the number of areas authorised to
hold the concentrate was 2–11 for small trusts; 4–11 for
medium trusts, and 5–27 for large trusts.
Eighty seven of the 207 areas visited were found to be in
possession of concentrated potassium chloride solution
(table 2). Eighty two of these were named in trust policies
as authorised. Of the five areas in three trusts that were not
authorised, two (accident and emergency and renal unit) lay
within the NPSA’s definition of critical care areas and two
were theatre recovery areas, which had been authorised in
other trusts. Strong potassium chloride solution was found
on only one general medical ward (from which it was
promptly removed by the lead pharmacist) and no potassium
phosphate was found outside intensive care units.
Storage
The audit revealed that, of the 87 wards and departments in
which strong potassium chloride was found, in 70 cases it
was stored in the controlled drug cupboard, in seven in the
outer drug cupboard, and in 10 in a separate locked cupboard
(100% compliance). Storage of potassium dihydrogen phos-
phate was also in line with the alert. Overall, it was clear that
in the majority of areas the storage space for controlled drugs
was inadequate for its purpose and, had potassium chloride
been made a true controlled drug under the provisions of the
act, many trusts would have required a wholesale replace-
ment of these cupboards. As it is, in most wards these tiny
cupboards are piled high with drugs, frequently necessitating
the removal of several boxes to locate the drug required.
Recording
Fifty seven (65%) of the areas in which the strong solution
was found were recording its use in a controlled drug register
and 25 (29%) were using a separate potassium register. Five
(6%) were not making any record. The failure to record the
use of strong potassium chloride was an error in four cases
Table 1 Percentage of each staff group reached by stated means of communication
Staff group
Guidance/policy
circulated Memo Email
Routine
meeting
Orally by
pharmacist Other
Educational
event
Ward sister/Charge nurse 27.0% 25.2% 15.3% 12.6% 27.9% 27.9% 3.6%
Staff nurse 18.2% 47.3% 3.6% 14.5% 12.7% 21.8% 0.0%
House officer 5.6% 61.1% 0.0% 5.6% 5.6% 50.0% 5.6%
SHO 0.0% 7.1% 0.0% 0.0% 14.3% 50.0% 0.0%
Specialist registrar 20.0% 0.0% 20.0% 20.0% 20.0% 40.0% 0.0%
Other 50.0% 28.6% 28.6% 21.4% 21.4% 21.4% 0.0%
Figures do not sum to 100% as some respondents quoted more than one source of information.
Table 2 Wards audited indicating whether or not authorised to stock strong potassium chloride solution
Wards and departments
No of authorised
areas visited
No of unauthorised
areas visited Total visited
KCl found in
unauthorised area
Recording error found
in at least one entry in
book
Accident & emergency 5 5 10 1 4
Coronary care 12 4 16 1
High dependency 6 4 10 2
Intensive care 28 1 29 4
Medical 2 53 55 1 1
Obstetrics 3 2 5 3
Paediatric 5 6 11
Renal unit 2 2 4 1
Surgical 0 35 35 2
Special care baby unit 10 0 10
Theatre – recovery 7 6 13 2 2
Theatre – anaesthetics 2 2 4 1
Other 0 5 5
Total 82 125 207 5 20
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and a deliberate strategy in one intensive care area where the
staff maintained that they already recorded and double
signed the administration of potassium chloride in the
patient’s care plan and so refused to sign the controlled drug
register for the preparation, citing pressure of time.
‘‘The hardest bit of the guidance has been the double checking and
signing for … given that they already had to double sign the
treatment card and double sign the label and what they were very
concerned about was taking a one to one nurse away from a patient to
go to a cupboard.’’ (Clinical risk manager)
In addition to these five wards, auditors noted 13 cases in
which second signatures were missing and two in which
patients’ names were not recorded.
Out of hours arrangements
No pharmacy in any of the 20 trusts visited was open for
24 hours. Typically, out of hours arrangements, as described
by senior managers and confirmed by policy documents,
indicated that the first action was to borrow a stronger
commercially prepared solution from another ward area or,
through the nurse in charge, to access these from an
emergency drug cupboard. If these measures proved insuffi-
cient, the on-call pharmacist was to be contacted. In one trust
the nurse in charge had authority to dispense with the on-call
pharmacist in specific life threatening clinical emergencies,
providing certain conditions were met.
Actual and potential unintended consequences
Senior managers were asked whether they had concerns
about any unintended consequences of the implementation
of the guidance. Five stated that there was a need to monitor
whether restrictions were impeding access to potassium for
patients who required it. This was of particular concern in
cardiac theatres and cardiac intensive care units where
potassium levels can fall quickly.
‘‘In cardiac surgery you do actually use large volumes of potassium
and some of it is actually not prescribed by doctors but perfusionists –
the people who drive the cardiopulmonary bypass. Their role includes
putting potassium into the heart lung machine. In a way,
cardiopulmonary perfusionists are practitioners in their own right
and they have their own system of registration.’’ (Consultant
anaesthetist)
Concern was also expressed at the potential for deskilling
staff in non-authorised areas, bearing in mind that all but
four trusts retained the right to make the strong solution
available for named patients on unauthorised areas. Some
managers pointed out the need for constant vigilance lest the
concentrate find its way back into unauthorised areas as a
result of lack of storage space for, or non-availability of,
commercially produced solutions or for reasons of cost or
access. Finally, two were anxious about inappropriate use of
the stronger solutions (40 mmol in 100 ml; 50 mmol in 50
ml) of which clinicians had no prior experience.
‘‘There was a fear that we were changing the risk from the
ampoules to the 40 mmol in the 100 ml bags. Firstly, they are
unlicensed and, secondly, although not as concentrated as the
injection, they can still cause harm so we had to demonstrate that we
weren’t merely transferring the risk from one preparation to
another.’’ (Chief pharmacist)
One pharmacist reported a recent case of a consultant
giving the stronger solution as a bolus injection through a
peripheral vein.
Unresolved issues
Both managers and ward staff were invited to comment on
any issues arising from the alert and some of their responses
have been embedded in sections above.
There had been a few recorded instances of problems
encountered since the implementation of the guidance. Staff
on paediatric and other wards with specific patient groups
(cardiac surgery) were concerned about having to go through
complex processes in the middle of the night to obtain the
concentrate, although these were not common complaints.
‘‘Fluid-restricted patients present a major challenge. The rigmarole
to get hold of the concentrate in the middle of the night is ridiculous.’’
(Ward sister)
There were also issues for manufacturers. Eighteen
managers and ward staff stressed the need to address the
packaging and labelling of ampoules and of IV solutions
containing potassium to clearly differentiate them and so
avoid confusion (fig 1).
‘‘After all that has been said about this, it is obscene that the
ampoules are so similar to water and sodium chloride. You would
have thought that they would have done something about it by now.’’
(Registered nurse)
‘‘The red writing on the IV bags is on the side of the bag. You need
it on the front of bag in red.’’ (Registered nurse)
Others stated that the sudden rise in demand for 40 mmol
potassium chloride in 100 ml solutions of sodium chloride or
glucose was creating problems for manufacturers and
stressed the importance of these substances being constantly
available.
‘‘We had to wait three months for the glucose bags – there is no
point in doing all this unless we can ensure a constant supply,
otherwise people will go back.’’ (Assistant chief pharmacist)
DISCUSSION
There are a number of limitations to this study. The 20 NHS
trusts that agreed to take part may not be an unbiased sample
even though the given reasons for non-participation were
unrelated to the research study reported here. Trusts had
around 6 weeks warning of our audit which may have
prompted implementation of the alert, although in all cases
the audit trail revealed activity from the date of the alert or
earlier, rather than commencing after our first contact.
Finally, the audit was carried out immediately after the
implementation date and thus we may have failed to identify
problems that had yet to surface, and conversely identified
easily resolvable problems. The main strengths of the study
lie in the physical inspection and audit trail which verified
both the accuracy of interview data and the effectiveness of
the management action.
Overall, the dissemination process from the NPSA to the
trusts and thence to senior managers had worked well. The
alert was welcomed by all pharmacists interviewed who felt
that it had lent authority to their efforts to restrict the
availability of concentrated ampoules and to promote the use
of commercially available dilutions. This illustrates a poten-
tial value of these communications in providing strong
central backing for the views of a significant professional
group which may stimulate more action from senior
managers than would otherwise be the case.
The list of areas permitted to stock potassium ampoules left
trusts some room for manoeuvre and, on advice from the
NPSA, most trusts had carried out a risk assessment and had
added general theatres, labour wards, and paediatric wards to
their list of authorised areas. There was wide variation in the
number of wards authorised within trusts of the same size,
which may indicate further room for removal of the
concentrate from clinical areas.
The only opposition to the requirements of the alert came
from intensive care staff, and particularly from those
involved with cardiac surgery patients, who cited as a
problem the time consuming nature of the new procedures
caused by the location of some controlled drug cupboards
and the fact that the drugs could only be checked out
ampoule by ampoule to address the immediate need of the
patient.
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Given that the literature is peppered with tales of patient
deaths arising from the confusion of potassium chloride with
sodium chloride and water for injection, it seems inappropri-
ate that the packaging and labelling has not been made more
distinctive.
Poor awareness on the part of junior doctors, despite the
commendable efforts of some pharmacists to communicate,
was a source of concern. The numbers interviewed in this
study are too small to justify recommendations in relation to
this finding, nor did any of the senior manager respondents
have any suggestions as to how to cope with this constantly
changing resource. However, there may be strength in the
prevailing view of the junior doctors that the management of
drugs was purely the province of nursing staff. Nurses may
both figuratively and literally ‘‘hold the key’’ to this problem
and, if they are provided with prescribing guidance in
relation to the administration of the potassium, they can
challenge prescriptions that they perceive to be inappropriate.
Our research suggests that strong potassium chloride has
been successfully removed from nearly all inappropriate
clinical areas and there is reason for optimism that this may
result in a marked reduction in sentinel events, as was
reported in the US.7 12 The finding is compatible with those
from the NPSA’s ‘‘learning and sharing’’ initiative with
trusts.13
The rapid and comprehensive impact of the safety alert is
likely to have been influenced by several factors that have
been shown in the literature to influence the uptake of
guidelines and other innovations.14–16 Most importantly in
this context, the proposed change is strongly supported by
evidence in the literature showing a clear advantage to
patients, a factor recognised by the key players. Unlike many
guidelines and efforts for behaviour change aimed at
clinicians alone, the approach adopted by the alert led to
action by senior management. This is vital, because change
does not take place in isolation from the organisational
context.16 The proposed changes were given strong backing by
hospital pharmacists and by senior nurses and clinicians,
who acted as opinion leaders and champions (though this by
itself had not hitherto been sufficient to produce the change
observed in this study). The safety alert was compatible with
the shared norms and values of health professionals and was
relatively simple to implement, in that no new skills were
required, nor significant resources entailed. New directives
such as that aimed at reducing the risk of wrong site surgery
which are more complex and which also challenge profes-
sional styles, may prove more difficult to implement. For
most staff there are likely to be few response barriers.
However, the indifference of junior doctors suggests that
sustaining the policy implementation may be challenging
with some groups. Continuing vigilance of pharmacy depart-
ments, with annual random monitoring checks, may be
required to ensure that ampoules do not effect a gradual
return to unauthorised wards by prescription on a named
patient basis. Cost, lack of storage space, inconsistent
availability of some of the newer stronger solutions, and
the difficulties in accessing concentrated potassium chloride
out of hours may also contribute to its return.
CONCLUSION
The NPSA alert was effective, resulting in a rapid implanta-
tion of local policies to reduce the availability of concentrated
potassium chloride solutions. The success is likely to be partly
due to the nature of the proposed changes and future alerts
may not be equally effective. Continued vigilance will be
necessary to help sustain the changes.
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